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CAN WE THINK OF SALVATION AS
A RETURN TO MENTAL HEALTH?
Frederick Sontag
A. The Modern Hope to Replace Salvation With a New Science
When we think of "mental health," we have not recently connected this to the
notion of "salvation" in Christian doctrine. There once was a time, of course,
when many who wanted to recover or restore mental health turned to Christianity
and found their healing. There are, I suppose, many reasons which can be given
for why this ceased to be true, but at least one of these involves the rise of
psychiatry as a profession and the well-known anti-religious sentiments of its
pioneers, most notably Sigmund Freud. Psychiatry arose as the modern and
"scientific" alternative to the healing and counseling practices of Christianity.
Thus, before we can decide whether "salvation" can be seen as a road to mental
health today, we must go back and consider how psychiatry came to replace it.
Ernest Becker is a good guide to assist us in this reappraisal. He is a champion
of the scientific status of the social sciences, and he believes in their ability to
revolutionize the study of man. He has written about the role psychiatry played
in this central venture of the modern age, 1 and he, an astute critic of the program
of psychiatry. At the same time he is a supporter of its claim to supplant traditional
religion. As the subtitle of his book indicates ("The New Understanding of
Man"), the issue revolves around whether a superior and perhaps scientific
knowledge of man became available which outdates all previous religious proposals for the healing of man. Should all "mental illness" now be defined to come
under the general category of "the science of man"? If so, it no longer falls
within the province of religion.
Briefly put, Becker's book massively documents the failure of the social
sciences to achieve their proposed revolution in the understanding of man such
that it becomes another area of science. He traces the reason for this failure to
the founding assumptions of the social sciences. Still, he remains optimistic that
all we need to complete the proposed revolution is a reordering of those original
assumptions. As Becker sees it, the chief problem is that "disciplinary proliferation" has had the effect of burying man. Thus, the social sciences have failed
to give us the clear, whole perspective on man we need in order to cure our ills.
To accomplish this Becker proposes a "radical recentering of the human sciences"
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which would take man's self-value ;is "the proper invariant point of reference
around which the various disciplines should revolve their efforts."2 In other
words, Becker thinks that our failure does not lie in the original assumption
which launched the social sciences but in a methodological problem. Having
failed to date, we can still proceed to build "a mature hypothetico-deductive
science," (p. x) or so Becker is convinced.
Of course, others have proposed that we adopt this "man-centered" orientation.
What is new in Becker's proposal is that he believes we now have enough
knowledge to forge a broadly inclusive and logically consistent science of man.
Becker admits that we have lived through an era of "disciplinary morass."
Nevertheless, for reasons which are not quite clear, he still thinks it is possible
to transform this into a "compelling rational basis for moral action" (p. x). Most
of the social sciences began with a crusading goal of this kind. They wanted to
improve the lot of mankind, but their zeal was lost somewhere along the way
as disciplinary cross-fire developed between them. The goal Becker sets out for
us is to overthrow the "narrow medical view of human ills" (p. 2). Psychology,
he thinks, must merge into a broad human science. "Mental illness" is cultural
behavior, not a narrow medical phenomenon.
Part of Becker's rejection of the role of traditional religion in mental health
stems from his conviction that the Enlightenment has come, making all things
new. "Man has on the whole become more sophisticated and rational," (p. 59)
he asserts. If this is true, new techniques are demanded and old ones are automatically outmoded. Becker admits "man's need to forgive himself each night, to
absolve himself so that he can begin again, anew" (p. 70). This, of course, is
the classical religious notion of confession and forgiveness, but still Becker feels
that today "religious motives have little to do with life as most people live it"
(Ibid). Thus, religion can be of no assistance in performing this needed task.
The appearance of schizophrenia "sums up man's coming of age in society" (p.
108). In other words, rather than decreasing psychic illness, evolutionary advance
increases it as man sheds his need of religion.
Action breaks down when the individual's sense of self-value is undermined.
In a secular world we must create a symbolic worth on our own. When human
action bogs down, meaning dies. "When the individual does not control meanings
symbolically, we call him 'mentally ill'" (p. 120). Although we have been at
odds about all of this for 50 years, Becker for some reason thought (in 1964)
that happily "the data of the human sciences are starting to emerge; their relationships are becoming clear" (p. 132). Whether or not his optimism is soundly
based is a crucial matter. If the day of religious help is past and if being alone
in the modern world actually increases mental illness, all is lost, that is, unless
we think all the social sciences are about to reach a level of agreement so that
they can step in and provide the needed solution. Cultural advance gave us this

318

Frederick Sontag

problem in the first place, according to Becker. "As soon as the theological
world view was undermined, man was doomed to examine his miserable condition" (p. 138).
This is a neat reversal of the usual charge that religion needlessly places
mankind under a burden of guilt from which the modem age, at last, can release
us. "Man has rolled up his shirt sleeves, eager to tamper with his own creation"
(p. 139), but the result is to make us less secure rather than more. On the positive
side, Becker is convinced that we are near to developing an ineluctable law for
human development. If true, this would help us reverse the tide and restore our
lost mental health. For this now to be possible depends on his theory that human
motivation owes almost nothing to primary biological drives. Thus, if man is
self-created via his culture, the animal side counts for less. If all our conduct
has been learned, it can all be unlearned, and we have a very plastic creature
on our hands which we can remold, that is, if an agreed law of human development
is now in our possession as Becker thinks. We no longer find it possible to give
a purely physical interpretation of man, but in spite of the important role given
to symbolism, Becker thinks it is possible to found a precise science of man.
He thinks that, at last, the final theory of man is here which can provide our
salvation. But in response, we must ask Becker: In rejecting the doctrinal rigidity
of Freud, have we not also done away with the possibility of finality? If so, then
are we in such an assured position to cure the mental illness which he attributes
to our loss of the theological world? Becker claims to see the human personality
from the inside, and it holds no more mysteries. Since the culture we create is
a fiction, he thinks, "the kind of people we make depends upon the kind of
people we want" (p. 167). Unlike the notion of original sin, our restrictions have
been caused by artificial restraints over which we can now assume control.
Becker feels that we no longer need to struggle against ourselves, against forces
deep within our nature. Rather, our only opponent is a world we ourselves have
fashioned during our early training.
The anxiety we now face arose from the possibility of abrogating an entire
framework of meaning. But at the same time this happened, our world lost its
mystery . We lost a world, but on the other hand we now know how to build a
new one. Neurosis grows due to a failure to symbolize and also by a constriction
of choice possibilities. Anxiety arises due to a lack of words that symbolize. If
so, this matter is now subject to our control. However, the issue we must face
is: Do we really create our world? It would be much easier for us to solve our
psychic problems if this were true; Becker is right about that. He thinks we
know where to pin the blame for human failure: on the flimsy symbolic basis
for human meaning we ourselves constructed. If this is the case, "there is very
little about the peculiar human condition that is not somehow in man's potential
control" (p. 183). Guilt and shame, though typically human, have been made
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by man and so may be unmade by us. Yet the issue remains: Do we really create
our world at will? If we do create it, of course, we can change it. But can we
really do that?
Modem man, in his quest for automony, is forcing culture's hand because,
Becker is convinced, we are about to gain control over man by learning how to
construct culture. All we need to do is to liberate ourselves from the fetters of
the excessive restraints of our early environment. This formula sounds easy
enough, but is it working today? Becker simply assumes that man has full control
over the means to construct culture, but can we agree to that? He defines "the
world" as rational and as self-constructed; therefore it can be reconstructed.
"Mental illness" becomes simply our failure to practice "a fully rational approach
to interpersonal living" (p. 206), which Becker assumes we have now learned
how to do at will. He adopts a traditional Enlightenment view: It is "ignorance"
that accounts for the seemingly irrational behavior of the mentally ill. Thus, our
illnesses can be cured by the new knowledge which has recently come into our
possession.
Medical psychiatry, of course, can no longer be in charge of the revision of
man, since accomplishing this change depends on developing a symbolic view
of man and the world. Becker's account makes mental illness easy. Therefore,
it can be cured easily, since it only depends on unstructuring and restructuring
our world views. Schizophrenia is a stupidity. The victim lacks behavior patterns
to manipulate means and ends. Thus, the "normal" individual is now defined as
the creative one, "the one who exercised control over his choice of means and
ends" (p. 209). The history of modem psychology, thus becomes a history of
its own disillusionment as a science. "Psychology has evolved back into
philosophy," he thinks (p. 120).
However, since Becker does not seem aware of his own assumptions (that is,
his whole theory seems obvious to him), he has turned psychology into a social
philosophy. He thinks we can now stamp out mental illness by putting the control
of means and ends sequences back into the hands of the people who need to
make the choices. It is just that simple. As he has defined it, we now are faced
with the opportunity to control the social world (p. 125). Becker makes this
assertion in response to his inquiry into psychoanalysis. We can wrest control
of the tools of mental health from religion, but only if we establish a new science
which can exercise this kind of power, he thinks. But, if Becker is wrong, as I
believe he is, and the modem world has failed in this effort, Christianity with
its less precise doctrines is not in such an unfavorable position.
However, this change in man's mental health, which Becker is so sure the
social sciences can induce, requires all individuals to change together. Since the
criticism of religion is centered on its piecemeal approach and its lack of ability
to change whole cultures, the new social science approach must be based on
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mass change. If it is not, we are back to the village priest counseling his
parishioner. Psychiatric problems represent human failures, because they indicate
a lack of human control in situations where choice is called for. Since this is
thought to depend on an ignorance of the possibilities present in an ordered
world, once we realize this, mass change will come by maximizing individual
choice, or so Becker postulates.
However, if it is the individual who controls his own choice rather than some
"science," you have to be sure the individual will always seek change as he or
she is supposed to. Maximizing choice may be the only way to meet the challenge
of twentieth century society, but Becker treats it as a matter of "available vocabularies of motivation" over which the individual lacks free control. The "real
problem" is the one of "individual integration" (p. 128), he says. But isn't Becker
operating under an illusion: That if only we do a little something new in education,
each individual will suddenly take over the task of creating himself and all will
be fine. There are powerful interests who wish to curb human spontaneity, such
as Marxism. Becker can only carry out his analysis by assuming that what he
says is true of every man everywhere, not just of some. Becker says: "We seem
to be calling for nothing less than a total reenlistment of society in the furtherance
of human design" (p. 225).
At this point what we must ask Becker is: Will altering culture through education
really produce free individuals, each one capable of handling decisions, or will
this procedure merely inculcate another type of conformity? Becker thinks he
has "a total problem" (p. 228). He has the power, via the new science, to program
for a full exercise of human freedom. "The twentieth century is witnessing a
revolution in self-awareness that has not been seen since the Renaissance and
the time of the Greeks," Becker asserts expansively (Ibid.). But we need to
assess this claim carefully to see if his thesis really can produce the mental health
Becker desires. Like so many others, Becker gives aesthetic experience a particularly heavy role. It takes the place of religion and God in its healing potential:
"The aesthetic object shows that the perfect union of ends and means is possible.
It embodies ... the vision that fulfillment is possible" (p. 233). Art takes on the
same function as the Marxist goal of the classless society or the Christian heaven.
Religious ritual, long used as an avenue to restore psychic balance, is dismissed.
Aesthetic ritual takes its place. "This is the function of ritual, to interweave
inextricably the symbolic and the organic, by gesture and sound, body balance,
measured movements" (p. 237). That is the modern avenue to mental health.
But if we ask why art is expected to do so much for us now, we have to reply:
Because religion isn't doing it. "The aesthetic object demonstrates that life is
not in vain, by holding up tangible proof of human creativity" (p. 239). Art
provides the meaning to life which religion formerly did, and Becker never
denies that our mental health demands this kind of guarantee of human signifi-
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cance. Just as religion used to transcend the world, so Becker thinks aesthetics
now takes man beyond the confines of culture. Human values become supreme.
In a pre-scientific day religion stressed the healing power of love, and now
Becker ties love to aesthetics. He sounds like Paul's letter to the Corinthians
when he says: "Thus love banishes shame, transcends the fictitious learning, the
sham morality" (p. 241). The primary aim of psychotherapy is accomplished by
love, he feels. "The individual accepts his past and his uniqueness as irrevocable,
as necessarily and desirably so" (p. 240). Since the love object functions as the
psychotherapist, we have here the counterpart of the religious claim that "Jesus
accepts you" or "God loves you." But our question must be: Is this true for most
cases? Is he treating love as a romantic ideal rather than as it exists in fact? Love
may mirror the religious experience of release that men so long found healing,
but can love and aesthetics accomplish this alone? Perception and contemplation
of the unique, existential, loved-object has taken the place of the mass, confession,
and forgiveness.
Becker wants the loved object to function as the psychotherapist, or perhaps
we should say, as the priest. Jesus accepts you; God loves you, and the prime
religious experience is that of release. But can art and a love object do this as
well? Becker has set humankind up in a situation which does not eliminate our
religious needs but rather takes them as a part of human nature, but then he
proposes that these same functions be shifted to non-religious offices. Becker
ties love to beauty so that art becomes involved in overcoming the split between
self and world. The loved object somehow adds the meaning life needs in order
to go beyond being a simple natural process. Love now has the power to forgive
which people .formerly sought in God. Of course, what must be noted again is
that this assertion depends on a very idealized notion of "love." In ordinary
circumstances love is as much the source of our bondage as of our release.
Recognizing that our situation at the present time is not quite like the picture
he paints, Becker puts a great deal of stress on the changes education can bring
about in the future. But if the future is to be different from the past, what will
provide this change? Becker places his hope on education. He wrote Revolution
in Psychiatry in 1964, but what has happened to education in the meantime?
Rather than agreeing on a new educational program and then implementing it,
we are in even greater disagreement about our educational programs, and many
think the whole system is faltering. Rather than freeing us, education itself has
become a prime source of controversy. We are surely further from an agreed
educational agenda than when Becker wrote. If so, does that give us much
optimism about the likelihood of accomplishing this revolution via education
and thus providing a substitute religion? Becker has defined us into a religious
situation of need, but has he left us any way to satisfy this short of a return to
tradition?

322

Frederick Sontag

In a later book (1969) Becker again stresses his aim to "educate, elevate, and
free man" (p. vii).3 The problem with this, of course, is that such a change must
be achieved universally, not just accomplished by an elite education for a few.
Traditional religion was criticized because it offered release but only to its devoted
followers. The aim of the modem world was to universalize this and to open
release to all mankind. Becker pinned his hope for the realization of this goal
on a new understanding of man and on an educational program which is scientifically based, just as Marx pinned his hope on an economic theory and social
revolution. But the hoped for universal agreement on a new theory of human
nature has not materialized; all the while our trust in education to release us has
been disappointed time and time again.
We need, says Becker, "a rich and meaningful world" to which we can be
committed (p. 10). But even if this is the case, the issue is: Can we create the
process ourselves and keep it under our own control? To put it simply, Becker
offers us a new alternative to the Christian offer of salvation. His is based on
the same perception of needs, but he removes the power from God's hands and
places it in man's. Our problem would be quite different if Becker did not agree
that all men and women still do need release, forgiveness, and restoration. Like
Camus' The Fall, he has placed us in a situation of religious need but offers a
secular solution. We must assess the basis of Becker's optimism and decide
whether something so new has been added that it enables us to be optimistic
about self-rescue now when we could not be before. There is no question but
that psychiatry deals effectively with some special cases, but can it cure "the
human predicament"?
The proposed program of the social sciences and modem psychiatry has been
around long enough so that, even if we do not pronounce it a total failure (which
would be too harsh), we can say that it has not had the universal releasing effect
its enthusiasts hoped for (which is also true of Marxism). In some eyes, the rise
of modem science made religion'S promise of cure obsolete, but Becker's reappraisal actually makes religion a viable option once again. If a final secular cure
has not appeared as the modem alternative we hoped for, no alternate source of
mental health can be ruled out as antiquated. If we reject the long-assumed
notion of an absolute line of progress, we are obligated to reinvestigate all cures,
religious and otherwise, which offer relief. We have today returned from universalism to individualism.
B. The Return to A Christian Notion of Salvation
What did "salvation" originally mean as an offer to restore mental health? In
forming a reply to this question, we should note that all Christians have not and
do not agree on one precise meaning for "salvation." Yet in opposition to Becker's
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proposal some features stand out: (1) A relation to God is required for effective
cure versus simply the use of human procedures; (2) this involves a transcendence
of nature. That is, we admit that the means of our salvation are not totally
available to us at will, which is precisely the notion modem humanists fought
against; (3) God has acted through revelation to open salvation to all who will
accept it, but this depends on certain persons, scriptures, and the institutions
that stand for these; (4) at least some who receive salvation find themselves
radically transformed, returned to mental health. But this happens by a power
which comes from outside, not from inside nature. The action that restores is
essentially done to them, although human instruments or intermediaries may be
involved; (5) however, all this being said, we must admit that an interest in
religion and a tendency to mental imbalance lie close together. It is not so simple
a matter as that everyone is restored who has contact with religion. Since the
pursuit of religion destroys some who become involved, it is a mixed factor in
human life. Were this not so, we would not have the intense feelings which
arise when friends or family experience traumatic conversion to new religious
movements. Many fear the cure all the while it is pursued.
But when it does come, what are the therapeutic effects of salvation? How
does it produce mental health, and do these results differ significantly from those
obtained by secular procedures? The main factor in the religious situation, I
believe, is that the person has come to feel burdened with guilt, however acquired,
and this places his psychic life under a shadow. Those who still believe the
promise of the Enlightenment fight against the religious feeling of guilt as being
"abnormal." Release from this oppression can come but only as a result of
forgiveness, Christianity contends. Essentially, this generous gift is thought to
be divine in origin, but it may be administered by human agents of religion.
The return to mental health, then, involves lifting the burden of guilt. The result
is often reported as a return to wholeness. The one who suffers from guilt feels
split and incapacitated because of the accumulated burden. The cleansing action
of forgiveness releases psychic energy to function effectively, rather than digging
one deeper into self-recrimination. The man or woman acts and feels as if he or
she had been made new.
It is this feeling of restoration to a lost original state that is most characteristic
of salvation as an avenue to mental health. Popularly we call it to be "born
again." Although it is not always rightly understood, this phrase is an accurate
symbol for the person's restored state. Wrong actions and unsuccessful projects
have burdened down the individual to make him or her feel old before his or
her time. Thus, salvation is a recovery of newness and the return to a sense of
the innocence of youth.
Kierkegaard thought that innocence was not a virtue one should wish to recover,
but much of Christianity differs with him on this matter, although 'innocence'
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need not involve 'naivete.' Mental illness is the state of carrying a burden too
heavy to bear. Salvation is the release from that incapacitating burden. Adam's
actions banished him from the Garden of Eden. He was doomed to suffer and
operate at a lower capacity until such time as he could recover his lost state of
innocence. That is why salvation is spoken of as the state of becoming a child
again. The lost Garden of Eden is restored, in the sense that one feels innocence
recovered and no hindrances to the exercise of natural powers. Secular therapy
explores childhood states, but its aim is to carry the patient beyond them. Salvation
claims that it is only by return to an earlier, primitive state which all once shared
that mental health can be restored.
Of course, anyone who advocates following the religious life as a means to
mental health has to admit that many who seek it never find it. Just as salvation
lies near to destruction in the religious syndrome, many who seek it end up lost.
Thus, a certain lack of control goes with the method of religion, versus the claim
of psychiatry to greater accuracy with its method. One needs to assent to much
more in Christianity than in modem psychiatry as a precondition to sharing in
its promised health. One need not "believe in" Freud or Jung to be cured by
their methods, or so it seems. Thus, Christianity is not a "full rationalism,"
because it assumes that reason is as much a part of the problem as it is of the
answer. Our cure is often blocked by our belief in Becker's assertion that reason
alone should now take control. Our confidence lies in our power to recreate
ourselves although society often corrupts us. Rational investigation, traditional
Christianity believes by way of contrast, can never be more than a stage of the
initial quest. Reason as such does not move the emotions in the way they need
to be altered, Christianity asserts.
One difficulty which Christianity faces, in addition to its individual versus
universal offer, is that its salvation is never full and complete at the time. The
"restored person" is only partially or provisionally returned to new life. The
person may enjoy his or her release as if it were a complete act. But the notion
of Jesus' "Second Coming" is a symbol for the fact that the present era must be
brought to a close and the whole earth transformed before individual restoration
can be complete and final. Thus, the individual who experiences salvation and
the gift of new life does so only by participating, in advance, in a world yet to
be brought fully into existence. This partial or provisionary nature of all Christian
experience of salvation can lead to disappointment or loss. A first experience of
joy moves easily to disappointment, particularly if the individual is unable to
sustain his hope for the future and cannot continue his religious life in anticipation
of a final transformation. Furthermore, in Christianity this new hope must be
shared and passed on to others by specific acts to relieve their suffering. It cannot
be held alone. It fades fast if not transferred.
This fragile and incomplete nature of salvation leads to the common
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phenomenon of disillusionment or even bitterness that often develops in the
religious novice only too soon after conversion and its experience of release.
The new member of the religious group often expects something more complete
and permanent than an indefinite transitional stage can offer. The joy of
experiencing the return of mental health causes the receiver to count on more
than has been promised. The human intermediary in this religious process may
have made stronger or more absolute promises than the doctrine and past experience can support. Or, in their enthusiasm, disciples project greater powers of
tran~formation onto the leader than anyone but God can provide. This explains
the psychological necessity to claim a divine status for the "messenger of God."
In addition, since God is at the center of all this and not a humanly contrived
knowledge, the notorious elusiveness of Divinity makes the search for mental
health through salvation more like a life-long pilgrimage than a permanent present
discovery. The issue is one of whether you can find health and release in a
situation of permanent quest. Disillusionment can set in early in both love affairs
and religious transformation.
As Ernest Becker illustrates, the ages of modem science and rationalism hoped
to open a route to mental health that was universally available, one more under
human control, one less involved in transcendence and more permanent in its
effect. In addition to our previous discussion as to whether this project has
succeeded, as we look over the record of psychiatry, we must also ask if the
human psyche is of such a nature that its mental health will always be volatile
and vulnerable. One illustration will suffice to indicate the nature of this difficulty.
I stated above that God's involvement in the process of salvation introduces
added complexity as well as offering help. Many representatives of religion offer
their road to salvation as secure, final, and seemingly easy. But when the psyche
faces God, the neatness of the offered solutions often fade away as one discovers
how elusive and difficult God can be to deal with, due to Divinity's transcendence
of human ways and norms. This is why "faith" is required to continue on in any
religious group. That is, release may come, but salvation is a matter which
knows no final solution in the present age.
Beyond all this lies the question of whether some, if not all, human consciousness demands, or is oriented to, a transcendence ofthe natural order. The modem
age intended either to domesticate God, as Descartes did, or to place him outside
nature, as Hume and Kant both did. This left us free to deal with the psyche as
a natural phenomenon. But if God is an unavoidable object of search for many
human beings, our psyche remains open to transcendence in a way that predisposes
it to heroic quests. Becker himself suggests this, but hopes to keep it within
natural bounds. The tendency to look beyond the natural order prevents us from
settling down to a restricted and controllable sphere of activity. That which offers
us new life and mental health is the same force which drives us continually
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beyond both ourselves and nature in a life of search for the Divine. If this is the
human situation, mental health is not easy to find or to maintain, and it can
never be possessed with finality. But human life as an open-ended challenge can
be exciting, once we have gotten over our natural disappointment in the failure
of the social sciences to provide us with mental health on a universal and
permanent basis within our control as modem scientists. Today the promises of
religious salvation remains a possibility for every man and woman to explore,
even if the mental health which Christianity offers is a pursuit and not an achieved
state.
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